Secret Taiwan defence plans at centre of spy war with China

In 2022, Chen Yimin, a marine sergeant in Taiwan’s navy, was in debt and desperate for money.

He came across an online advertisement for a loan shark working on behalf of the Chinese government who made him an offer: hand over classified military secrets and you’ll receive cash handouts.

Chen agreed.

Over the course of a year, he downloaded and printed top secret documents from the databases at two of Taiwan’s military bases, taking photos and sending them to his “business manager” over online messaging platforms.

He was paid 170,000 New Taiwan dollars (£4,100) before his arrest in early 2023 and was later sentenced to two years and two months in prison under Taiwan’s National Security Law.

He is one of more than a hundred Taiwanese veterans, on-duty officers and civil servants recruited to spy for Beijing in recent years as China prepares for an invasion of Taiwan.

The Taiwanese authorities have admitted that some of these spies may have gained access to secret defence plans, now in Beijing’s hands, which could weaken Taiwan and increase China’s offensive capabilities.

Many of these individuals, including Chen, are now in prison, facing charges under Taiwan’s National Security Law, but there are believed to be others still working in secret.

Baiting the fish

As China stages record military drills in the waters around Taiwan, its military threat is obvious. But it is difficult to assess how vulnerable Taiwan might be internally, explained David Hsu, the deputy director of Taiwan’s ministry of justice investigative bureau (MJIB).

In an exclusive interview with The Telegraph, Mr Hsu discussed at length how China recruits spies in Taiwan, the type of intelligence it seeks and the risks posed by these espionage campaigns.

In 2024, Taiwan charged 64 people with espionage-related offences, an increase from 48 the year before. About 80 per cent of those are connected to the defence forces, including active-duty personnel, while around 20 per cent are civil servants, according to MJIB, one of nine agencies in Taiwan that work on mitigating the threat of Chinese espionage.

“If they see that these retired military officers have some connections with the Taiwanese political, military or diplomatic systems, they will try to approach them and recruit them,” said Mr Hsu.

The process normally begins with grooming, where the target will be wined and dined, and “then they will proceed with what they really want”, he said.

When in-person recruitment isn’t possible, another common strategy is to reach targets through online banking schemes or “underground banking”, such as with Chen.

“They are looking for soldiers who are in financial shortages and provide them loans, but they will tell them ‘you work for me and if you get this information you don’t have to pay me back’,” said Mr Hsu, adding that they will offer rewards for especially sensitive intelligence.

Nathan Attrill, a senior analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, explains that China is overwhelmingly focused on gaining intelligence surrounding “Taiwan’s ability to fight”.

“Every leak makes Taiwan’s deterrence look thinner from Beijing’s perspective. If China knows Taiwan’s mobilisation timelines, radar coverage or command-and-control layouts, it can design an attack that exploits those weaknesses from the very first minute,” he said.

“With stolen intelligence, the PLA [People’s Liberation Army] can be rehearsing against the real thing: Taiwan’s actual air-defence posture and operating patterns, thus shortening its planning cycle, and building an invasion plan precisely around Taiwan’s blind spots.”

According to MJIB, China recruits spies across its three main systems: the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the PLA and government agencies, including the intelligence apparatus, and the ministry of state security.

China recruits spies inside Taiwan in a variety of ways, but a common practice is to establish contact face to face in order to build trust.

Chinese nationals face heavy restrictions, from both Taipei and Beijing, when travelling to Taiwan, so handlers will often wait for Taiwanese nationals to travel to China, whether on business or to visit friends or family.

MJIB has also noticed a number of current and former military officials recruited over dating apps as well as social media, such as Facebook and LinkedIn, but this is less common.

Along with stealing classified intelligence, targets are also often instructed to recruit their peers to build a larger network.

J Michael Cole, a Taipei-based senior fellow with the Global Taiwan Institute and a former Canadian intelligence officer, said that in these scenarios the recruiters “come from circles which the targeted asset is part of”, which include the same political party, the same business, the same branch of the military, or even a family member.

In one notable example from 2023, a retired Taiwanese serviceman was first recruited by a Chinese intelligence officer and went on to recruit another nine current and former army personnel who handed over intelligence on key military bases and training modules.

Civilian targets

While the majority of China’s targets are connected to Taiwan’s military, Beijing also seeks out civil servants and politicians.

In a high-profile case from September 2025, four men with ties to Taiwan’s president and former foreign minister were all sentenced to prison for spying on behalf of China.

One of the men, Wu Shang-yu, who received a four-year sentence, worked as a close aide to Taiwan’s president, Lai Ching-te, and had passed details of his travel itineraries to the Chinese government.

Another man, Ho Jen-chieh, who received eight years and two months, had previously worked as an assistant for national security council secretary-general Joseph Wu while he was Taiwan’s foreign minister.

“These are people who are part of the government who help make the rules and our political policies, and also are inspecting or auditing our budgets, so they are involved with a lot of the government affairs,” said Mr Hsu.

When it comes to recruiting these civil servants and their staff, Beijing often relies on one distinct strategy, according to Mr Hsu.

Agents will seek out individuals who studied in China and connect with them through their university networks.

In China, most universities have CCP members on their boards who are often responsible for recruiting the targets and serving as a liaison between them and other branches of government.

“When these people finish their studies in China and go back to Taiwan to work for the government or become a member of parliament or in any kind of public position, they will receive instructions from China to collect information about our policies, our budgets, or any kind of topics they would like to understand,” said Mr Hsu.

China will often look to recruit people who are more sympathetic to Beijing’s claims over Taiwan and those who express similar beliefs around “reunification”.

Some of Beijing’s political targets have access to high-profile politicians, as was the case September. Other times, China will seek out elected officials or individuals running for office.

Beijing will then help to fund their political campaign to maximise the chance that they are elected and from there the government can use the individual to help steer policy decisions.

There have been several cases involving politicians and members of Taiwan’s main opposition party, the Kuomintang (KMT), which is often seen as far more pro-China than the incumbent Democratic Progressive Party.

Earlier in 2025, a former aide to three KMT politicians was arrested for spying for China along with the assistant to a local KMT city councillor.

The UK got a taste of this when an espionage case involving two British former English teachers, one of whom worked as a parliamentary researcher in Westminster, resurfaced in September after it was controversially quashed.

Both men were accused of passing sensitive information, including insight into the Tory leadership race, to a senior official within the CCP.

Tackling the crisis

With hundreds of spy cases to date, Beijing has successfully reached individuals with access to the highest levels of Taiwan’s government and military, which could mean that critical intelligence has fallen into enemy hands.

MJIB says it cannot discount the possibility that China has obtained key defence plans or is puppeteering its agenda through politicians in government.

“It’s possible that some of this sensitive, confidential information has been leaked to mainland China via these espionage activities, but the relevant authorities are trying their best to make damage control,” said Mr Hsu.

Some of the military’s “manoeuvre operation plans” have been adjusted in response to certain leaks, but China keeps its cards close, so it’s difficult to know exactly what information has been compromised, said Mr Hsu.

New national security package

Taiwan has made combatting espionage an increasing priority over the last year.

In March, Mr Lai announced a new national security package which framed China as a “foreign hostile force” and introduced 17 strategies to combat Chinese threats to Taiwan.

In response to Chinese spying within Taiwan’s military, Mr Lai said that Taiwan would restore its military trial system to try active duty personnel and revise retirement benefits for personnel and their families.

He also proposed amending laws to increase the punishment against those who express loyalty to China.

By September, Taiwan had charged only 15 people with espionage-related offences in 2025. The number was expected to rise to 20 by the end of the year, but this is still a stark drop from the 64 cases reported in 2024.

Mr Hsu says the reason the number peaked in 2024 is because it was an election year so China increased its espionage activity, but the drop-off is also because of the effective strategies enacted by the government.

“We believe it’s quite serious because they are trying to infiltrate Taiwan, whether it’s through the military, the administrative system, parliament, public sector, private sector,” said Mr Hsu.

“However, we believe this can be effectively dealt with because we have strong inter-agency co-operation and strong capacities.”

Experts are less optimistic, especially given the magnitude of China’s efforts and the risk that it poses.

“Taiwan might be getting better at detecting infiltration, but the scale of China’s efforts remains enormous,” said Mr Attrill.

[Source: Daily Telegraph]